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Background: Bayesian approaches to police decision support offer an improvement upon more commonly used
statistical approaches. Common approaches to case decision support often involve using frequencies from cases
similar to the case under consideration to come to an isolated likelihood that a given suspect either a) committed
the crime or b) has a given characteristic or set of characteristics. The Bayesian approach, in contrast, offers formally
contextualized estimates and utilizes the formal logic desired by investigators.
Findings: Bayes’ theorem incorporates the isolated likelihood as one element of a three-part equation, the other
parts being 1) what was known generally about the variables in the case prior to the case occurring (the
scientific-theoretical priors) and 2) the relevant base rate information that contextualizes the evidence obtained
(the event context). These elements are precisely the domain of decision support specialists (investigative advisers),
and the Bayesian paradigm is uniquely apt for combining them into contextualized estimates for decision support.
Conclusions: By formally combining the relevant knowledge, context, and likelihood, Bayes’ theorem can improve
the logic, accuracy, and relevance of decision support statements.
Keywords: Investigative advising; Decision support; BIA; Bayesian statistics; Police investigationsFindings
Police investigators occasionally seek the support of spe-
cialists in various fields. Cases of murder and rape, for in-
stance, prompt the need to utilize all available resources
to prevent future offending by the perpetrators, and serial
offenses (believed to have a single perpetrator) can prompt
the employment of consultants to link the crimes and an-
ticipate likely sites of future offending (or the offender’s
“home base”; Rossmo 2000, 2009; Woodhams et al. 2007).
The statistical training and specializations of academic
criminologists and psychologists make them candidates
for such consultancy (Alison and Rainbow 2011). In the
United Kingdom (and some other Western countries)
law enforcement agencies have such consultants on
staff. The task of these professionals is referred to as
Behavioural Investigative Advising (BIA).
The field of BIA is young and still establishing profes-
sional and scientific standards (Dowden et al. 2007; Alison
and Rainbow 2011). The research literature and empirical
basis of BIA are rapidly expanding and improving
(Dowden et al. 2007; Almond et al. 2011). Investigators
have reported that BIA consultancy is useful both as aCorrespondence: jared.allen@psych.ryerson.ca
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medium, provided the original work is properlysecond opinion and as a decision support tool (Rainbow
2011). This tool aims to be accurate, useful, specific, and
falsifiable (Alison et al. 2003). This assures the consultancy
is beneficial to police and allows for the product to be
evaluated after the investigation.
The advising process can be summarized generally as
using the knowns of an investigation to estimate un-
knowns useful to investigators; for example, moving
from the known locations of a series of crimes to the
possible residence or workplace of the offender (Rossmo
2000). BIA consultants can assist in locating, describing,
and prioritizing suspects by contributing scientific know-
ledge and formal analysis of “national datasets and other
relevant base rate data” (Rainbow et al. 2011 p. 37). That
is, their contribution is the assimilation of research lit-
erature, evidence, and context to optimize decision
making.
Due in part to its recent genesis as a scientific field of
study, there are a multitude of quantitative approaches
used by BIA professionals to arrive at estimates for deci-
sion support. The vast majority of these (e.g., correlation,
Jaccard’s indices, chi-square tests, logistic regression)
may aptly be called “frequentist”. That is, the majority of
approaches involve either interpreting likelihoods fromaccess article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
y/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
cited.
Figure 1 Bayes’ Theorem expressed in a) probability statements, b) Bayesian terms, and c) investigative language.
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testing to interpret estimates of unknowns.
Bayesian statistical inference is the algorithmic com-
bination of previous and new data to obtain the prob-
ability of one or more causes producing the new data
(Gill 2009; de Morgan 1838). This is different from infer-
ring the simple probability of said data being observed
(randomly or otherwise), which is the cornerstone of the
more commonly used frequentist methods.
Bayes’ theorem formally combines quantifications of
one’s pre-analysis information (a prior), some base rate
criminological and demographic data (a normalizing
constant), and a likelihood of obtaining one’s evidence.
As shown in Figure 1, the prior and likelihood are multi-
plied together and divided by the normalizing constant,Table 1 Differences between Bayesian and Frequentist/Fisher
Bayesian
Context Incorporates past knowledge
Null hypothesis Result based on strength of the evidence
What is random The parameters describing the relationships within the da
as random within some distribution. (e.g., in Markov chain
methods, the data is treated as constant, but the relation
researcher from the data to a prediction are randomly ite
the model for each data value and determine how param
Logic Follows “inverse logic”, moving from effect to estimation
Philosophy Probability is a measure of evidence, belief, or willingness
to gamble based on all available information
Summative
statement
“The probability of H, given the evidence, is x%”
Primary
difficulty
New information must compete with old, making the pro
of discovery more conservative and necessarily cumulativ
Pragmatic
difficulty for BIA
Determining the measure of one’s priors can be difficult,
methods can be perceived as unscientific, especially in leyielding one’s new conclusion or estimate (the posterior).
This is more generally expressed as: The probability of a
hypothesis (H) given an observation (O) is equal to the
probability of obtaining the observation given the hy-
pothesis is true, multiplied by the prior probability of
the hypothesis, divided by the unconditional probability
of obtaining the observation.
Key distinctions between Bayesian and frequentist
(also called Fisherian) approaches to BIA estimation are
the use of a null hypothesis and the use of prior infor-
mation. Bayesian logic involves treating data as constant
and modelling one’s belief about relationships in the data
based on the context of the data and the data, whereas
frequentist logic involves treating the data as random, ig-
noring the context of the information so as to beian approaches to investigative inference
Frequentist/Fisherian
Ignores past knowledge
Result typically (but not necessarily) based on
assumption of no effect or assumption of a statement






The data are treated as random so that the likelihood
of obtaining it under the null can be assessed
of cause Typically uses null logic: rejection of no effect
to infer effect
Probability is relative frequency over time.
“If its contrary were true, then the chances of H (or a
more extreme statement of H) would be less than x%”
cess
e
The assumption of no difference is always false.
Given a large enough sample size, any difference
will be found statistically significant.
and Bayesian
gal circles
Does not produce estimates of the form typically
desired (e.g., “a 77% chance”), and results logically
pertain to the data itself, not to the prediction
of new cases
Allen Crime Science 2014, 3:2 Page 3 of 5
http://www.crimesciencejournal.com/content/3/1/2“objective”, and—typically—evaluating the existence of a
relationship from the initial standpoint of the assumption
that no relationship exists. Table 1 details key relevant dif-
ferences between Bayesian and frequentist approaches to
statistical inference. Note, however, that some exceptions
to these differences may exist, especially when considering
very simple applications of Bayes’ theorem and very com-
plex applications of frequentist statistics.
Bayes’ theorem can be effective both as a tool and as
an analogue to the logical problems faced by investiga-
tors. Tartoni et al. (2006) note that Bayesian analysis is
well-suited for nearly all aspects of forensic investigation,
and Schneps and Colmez (2013) illustrate the grievousTable 2 Procedural comparisons based on a (highly simplified
Example case
Given: Two homicide cases in which knives and strangle wires were us
strangle wire were used in case 2).
Task: Assess whether
a) the two cases are linked (i.e., they have a common offender), and




1) “Crunch” all data from a relevant databa
into a minimal number of fundamental
2) Link the cases based on the similarity of
along these dimensions such that, if the
uncommonly similar dimensional scores
the frequencies of such scores (accordin
predetermined rule), it is predicted that
linked.
Note that this analysis estimates how prob
scores are assuming they occur by chance
is a different question than whether they a
linked.
Bayesian approach 1) Keep each behavioural variable (in both
and the cases themselves) as an individu
information, and evaluate the case inform
Bayesian reasoning. For this, iteratively tr
with the cases of a relevant database to
random variable: linkage.
2) Produce a probability estimate of whethe
are linked given their behavioural variable
is, combine using Bayes’ theorem the cas
and the trained model developed from th
into a posterior estimate. This approach tr
conditional likelihood (from “a 2” above) a
element of the linkage estimate.errors that can occur when cases are built solely based
on an isolated frequentist analysis of the evidence. For
example, calculating a simple 1 in 6 chance of identify-
ing an offender from a line-up versus a 1 in 12 chance
may lead one to believe that having more individuals as
foils in a police line-up increases the posterior probabil-
ity that an accurate match was made. Wells and Turtle
(1986) noted that this is not the case. They also shed
empirical light, using a Bayesian updating model, on the
practice of having all-suspect line-ups, which they found
increases the risk of false identification.
Blair and Rossmo (2010) tackle the issue of assigning
prior probability values for decision support. They argue) investigative advising example




1) The dimensional scores of the cases (obtained for “a”)
point vaguely to certain offender characteristics that
belong to or have similar dimensional scores as the
cases themselves (e.g., given the offender used both a
knife and a strangle wire, this may yield a higher score
on a “sadism” dimension. Assume being a stranger
offender is associated with sadism: If the offender is a
stranger, then the evidence is more likely than the







2) Use more specific base rate analysis to obtain
pared-down (quantified) likelihood estimates of the
offender being a stranger by seeing what percentage
of homicide cases involving a knife and strangle wire
also involved a stranger offender (this number, the





1) Narratively combine the above to obtain






1) Obtain the prior likelihood of the offender being a
stranger to the victim (this could be the simple base
percentage of stranger homicides among all







2) Produce a conditional likelihood, based on the
database, of an offender using a knife and wire
given the offender is a stranger to the victim.
1) Combine the prior, likelihood, and the case data
using Bayes’ theorem. In this way, the probability
that the offender is a stranger to the victim, based
on the fact that the offender used a knife and wire,
can be explicitly assessed within the context of the
(specific) pertinent data, and a singular value can be
obtained.
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guilt, and suggest assigning probability ranges to single
or multiple pieces of evidence. They note that this does
not solve the problem of assigning “guilt” values to
pieces of evidence, but the approach can result in “more
systematic assessments and improved investigative deci-
sion making” (Blair and Rossmo 2010 p. 133). On a cau-
tionary note, when using databases of convicted criminals
to estimate guilt, both the Bayesian and frequentist statis-
tical approaches may perpetuate biases in a system of
justice. That is, using the “usual suspects” to predict
characteristics of offenders could lead to further focus
on these individuals at the expense of other potential in-
vestigative leads. The Bayesian approach is not immune
to this criticism, though it is less vulnerable to the spe-
cific claim that its inherent logic is biased to this con-
clusion. Frequentist approaches assume the validity of a
null hypothesis, that is, they assume the predictor and
outcome variables may legitimately be thought to not be
related. When this logic is used to evaluate a candidate
suspect whose prior offenses are used in the model quan-
tifying his guilt, this assumption is grossly violated and the
logic of the frequentist estimator is circular. That is, the
offender’s statistical relationship to himself is used as evi-
dence against him because the test, in assuming no rela-
tionship, finds his relationship to himself “significant”. In
frequentist approaches, this is a violation of the logic of
the method. In Bayesian approaches this is not a logical
violation (since no null assumption is required and the
context of the information is adequately incorporated).
However, the potential for an offender’s resemblance to
himself to make his candidacy as a suspect more likely still
remains. The potential for this concern should be consid-
ered when using any statistical method to parse local data-
bases for BIA consultancy.
Table 2 presents a procedural comparison of two ap-
proaches to investigative advising, taken from Salo et al.
(2012) and Allen et al. (in press). These papers empiric-
ally compare Bayesian to non-Bayesian prediction for in-
vestigative advising. Salo et al. (2012) informs column a.
The study compared use of a Bayesian updating model
with a dimensional model to link homicide cases using
only offender behavioural information (i.e., only details
of what the offender did). Both models utilized identical
real-world data. The Bayesian approach, by better ac-
counting for absent information, resulted in 83.6% of
cases being correctly classified, versus 62.9% by the di-
mensional approach. Allen et al. (in press) informs col-
umn b. The study compared an empirical Bayesian
approach to a “pared-down” base rate method of esti-
mating offender characteristics. The Bayesian approach,
by incorporating more contextual information, resulted
in 74.6% prediction accuracy versus 63.5% accuracy of
the base rate method.Bayesian methods are subject to a disproportionate
amount of criticism for being “subjective” and prone to
misuse (e.g., Doren 2006). This is due in part to the
forthright philosophy of Bayesian analysis, which for-
mally “confesses” that Bayesian estimates, like all other
estimates, are a product of, and representative of, beliefs
about the hypothesis being explored. Popperian objectiv-
ity requires that the statements and evidence be entirely
in observable space (Popper 1972). Therefore, provided
all the values used in an analysis are thoroughly ex-
plained and justified, Bayesian methods are no less ob-
jective than their frequentist counterparts (which involve
many subjective choices).
Bayesian methods can formally contextualize, and thus
improve, frequentist analysis. In the 20th century, insur-
ance companies used Bayesian inverse probability, con-
trary to a rabidly Fisherian zeitgeist, without knowing
that their computations were incorporating Bayes’ the-
orem (McGrayne 2011). Similarly, courts in the United
States have been using Bayesian risk assessments
(Donaldson and Wollert 2008; Wollert 2007) while also
lambasting Bayesian approaches (e.g., Doren 2006). Con-
versely, BIA research has largely used frequentist
methods to perform a fundamentally Bayesian task.
Whatever the reputation of Bayesian analysis, the task
and field of BIA are fundamentally Bayesian. A Bayesian
approach to investigative advising is therefore the most
logical and promising way forward.
Abbreviation
BIA: Behavioural investigative advising.
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